When do stock options affect CEO risk-taking? The moderating role of CEO regulatory focus

被引：0

作者：

Chen, Yenn-Ru ^{[1
]}

Chung, Tuck Siong ^{[2
]}

Lin, Chia-Hsien ^{[3
]}

Low, Angie ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Chengchi Univ, Dept Finance, Taipei, Taiwan

[2] ESSEC Business Sch, Asia Pacific Campus, Singapore, Singapore

[3] Natl Chung Cheng Univ, Dept Finance, Chiayi, Taiwan

[4] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Div Banking & Finance, 91Nanyang Ave, Singapore 639956, Singapore

来源：

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING | 2024年 / 51卷 / 7-8期

关键词：

CEO regulatory focus; executive stock options; executive traits; risk-taking incentives; PROMOTION; COMPENSATION; PREVENTION; INCENTIVES; OVERCONFIDENCE; DECISION; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; EXECUTIVES; PLEASURE;

D O I：

10.1111/jbfa.12762

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Executive stock options are provided to risk-averse CEOs to encourage risk-taking. We show that the efficacy of such stock options is moderated by CEOs' regulatory focus-their intrinsic motivations to avoid losses or achieve gains. We show that stock options have a negligible impact on the risk-taking behavior of CEOs who are intrinsically motivated to avoid losses or take on risks. The impact of stock options on firm risk is strongest among CEOs whose regulatory focus is moderate and whose behavior is thus more malleable. Our paper shows that CEO intrinsic risk-taking motivations have important implications for the effectiveness of extrinsic risk-taking incentives provided by stock options.

引用

页码：1724 / 1761

页数：38

共 93 条

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