Waste recycling and yardstick competition among Italian provinces after the EU Waste Framework Directive

被引:8
作者
Ferraresi, Massimiliano [1 ]
Mazzanti, Massimiliano [2 ,3 ]
Mazzarano, Matteo [4 ]
Rizzo, Leonzio [2 ,5 ]
Secomandi, Riccardo [2 ]
机构
[1] European Investment Bank, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
[2] Univ Ferrara, Dept Econ & Management, Ferrara, Italy
[3] Sustainabil Environm Econ & Dynam Studies SEEDS, Ferrara, Italy
[4] Univ Siena, Dept Polit & Int Sci, Siena, Italy
[5] Inst Econ Barcelona IEB, Barcelona, Spain
关键词
spatial interactions; political budget cycle; waste management; recycling; yardstick competition; election; Waste Framework Directive; PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR; LOCAL-GOVERNMENTS; TAX MIMICKING; SOLID-WASTE; COUNTRIES; INTERDEPENDENCE; PERFORMANCE; COLLECTION; GENERATION; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1080/00343404.2022.2148643
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Recycling and the recovery of waste are crucial waste management strategies. In light of the new European Union (EU) circular economy approach, these strategies remain core pillars of a competitive and sustainable waste value chain. Local governments have an important role in controlling and checking the implementation of waste management policies. We study the spatial determinants of waste recovery using a dataset of 102 Italian provinces from 2001 to 2014. To induce a possible source of exogenous variation, we exploit the political cycle of the provinces to isolate the impact of waste recovery in neighbouring provinces on its own province's waste recovery. We find that after the transposition of the 2008 EU Waste Framework Directive, provinces mimic their own neighbours in the separate collection of waste aimed at recycling and recovery. This effect is more pronounced during pre-electoral years than non-pre-electoral ones, and fully guided by provinces where the president can run for re-election.
引用
收藏
页码:1535 / 1545
页数:11
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