Research on the heterogeneity of executives' nonsalary incentives on corporate green technology innovation

被引:4
作者
Xu, Ning [1 ]
Zhang, Di [1 ]
Li, Yutong [1 ]
Bai, Yingjie [1 ]
机构
[1] Shandong Univ, Dept Management, Jinan, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Green technology innovation; Equity incentives; Reputation incentives; Green governance; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; AGENCY PROBLEMS; CEO REPUTATION; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; COMPENSATION; GOVERNANCE; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1108/CMS-03-2023-0130
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
PurposeGreen technology innovation is the organic combination of green development and innovation driven. It is also a powerful guarantee for shaping sustainable competitive advantages of manufacturing enterprises. To explore what kind of executive incentive contracts can truly stimulate green technology innovation, this study aims to distinguish the equity incentive and reputation incentive, upon their contractual elements characteristics and green governance effects, and then put forward suggestions for green technology innovation accordingly.Design/methodology/approachThis study establishes an evaluation model and uses empirical methods to test. Concretely, using data from A-share listed manufacturing companies for the period from 2007 to 2020, this study compares and analyzes the impact of equity and reputation incentive on green technology innovation and explores the relationship between internal green business behavior and external green in depth.FindingsThis study finds that reputation incentives focus on long-term and non-utilitarian orientation, which can promote green technology innovation in enterprises. While equity incentives, linked to performance indicators, have a inhibitory effect on green technology innovation. Internal and external institutional factors such as energy conservation measures, the "three wastes" management system, and environmental recognition play the regulatory role in the relationship between incentive contracts and green technology innovation.Originality/valueThose findings validate and expand the efficient contracting hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis from the perspective of green technology innovation and provide useful implications for the design of green governance systems in manufacturing enterprises.
引用
收藏
页码:1583 / 1609
页数:27
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