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CFO pay convexity, risk taking and corporate hedging
被引:2
|作者:
Barbi, Massimiliano
[1
]
Febo, Valentina
[2
,4
]
Massimiliani, Irene
[3
]
机构:
[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Management, Bologna, Italy
[2] Metis Lab, EM Normandie Business Sch, Dept Law Finance & Control, Clichy, France
[3] Accenture, Milan, Italy
[4] Normandie Business Sch, 30-32 Rue Henri Barbusse, F-92110 Clichy, France
关键词:
CFO;
compensation;
derivatives;
hedging;
STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS;
AFFECT FIRM VALUE;
UPPER ECHELONS;
MANAGEMENT;
CHIEF;
COMPENSATION;
SPECULATION;
DERIVATIVES;
PRICE;
OIL;
D O I:
10.1111/eufm.12455
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We study how a CFO's risk-taking incentives affect corporate hedging by utilising hand-collected data from 2009 to 2019 on corporate hedging and managerial compensation for a sample of US oil and gas firms. The relative convexity of CFO equity compensation negatively affects the likelihood and extent of hedging. When the CFO and CEO have diverging risk-taking incentives, the relative convexity of the CFO's equity payoff prevails over that of the CEO. This evidence underscores the primary role of the CFO in steering a firm's hedging strategy.
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页码:1545 / 1586
页数:42
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