Faithful or fearless: directors' and officers' liability insurance and management discussion and analysis tone manipulation

被引:0
作者
Ru, Yi [1 ]
Zhao, Wei [1 ,3 ]
Su, Zihao [2 ]
机构
[1] Renmin Univ China, Sch Business, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Harbin Inst Technol, Sch Management, Harbin, Peoples R China
[3] Renmin Univ China, Sch Business, Accounting Dept, 59 Zhongguancun Ave, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
directors' and officers' liability insurance; management discussion and analysis; tone manipulation; DISCLOSURE; LANGUAGE; COVERAGE;
D O I
10.1080/16081625.2023.2225536
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine whether directors' and officers' liability insurance (D & O insurance) influences managers' strategic tone manipulation of management discussion and analysis. We find that D & O insurance is positively associated with upward tone manipulation. This association is more pronounced for firms with greater litigation risk or highly-motivated and overconfident managers. Additionally, we document more favorable short-term returns and intensive reversals responding to positive tones issued by D & O insurance-covered firms. Besides, D & O insurance-shielded managers may inflate the tone by reducing risk-factor information disclosures. Overall, our results support that D & O insurance can trigger managers' unethical manipulations by reducing their expected personal legal liability.
引用
收藏
页码:110 / 133
页数:24
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