Trust and Contracting: Evidence from Church Sex Scandals

被引:18
作者
Hilary, Gilles [1 ]
Huang, Sterling [2 ]
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ, Washington, DC USA
[2] Singapore Management Univ, Singapore, Singapore
关键词
Church scandals; Community trust; Firm management; AGENCY COSTS; CASH FLOW; RISK; INCENTIVES; PROPENSITY; REPUTATION; OWNERSHIP; BEHAVIOR; RELIGION; MATTER;
D O I
10.1007/s10551-021-04996-w
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Firms located in communities in which people are, on average, more trusting enjoy some benefits in terms of the power of CEO contracts. We present two pieces of empirical evidence to support this claim: (1) higher average trust in a county is associated with "flatter" executive contracts and (2) when an exogenous shock occurs (such as a scandal involving an important social institution), both trust and contracting move in similar directions. We obtain the first result in a panel specification and the second in a "difference-in-difference" specification that uses the revelation of sex scandals involving the Catholic Church across different U.S. localities.
引用
收藏
页码:421 / 442
页数:22
相关论文
共 54 条
[1]   AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS APPROACH TO FINANCIAL CONTRACTING [J].
AGHION, P ;
BOLTON, P .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (03) :473-494
[2]  
Al-Najjar Nabil I., 2002, Harvard Business School Working Paper
[3]   Inherited Trust and Growth [J].
Algan, Yann ;
Cahuc, Pierre .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2010, 100 (05) :2060-2092
[4]  
Allen F., 1992, ECON THEOR, V2, P1
[5]  
Angrist J. D., 1999, HDB LABOR EC A, P1277, DOI [10.1016/51573-4463(99)03004-7, DOI 10.1016/S1573-4463(99)03004-7]
[6]  
Angrist JD, 2009, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICISTS COMPANION, P1
[7]  
Bicchieri C, 2020, Handbook of experimental game theory, P241
[8]   Managing ethical risk: How investing in ethics adds value [J].
Chami, R ;
Cosimano, TF ;
Fullenkamp, C .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2002, 26 (09) :1697-1718
[9]  
Coleman J.S., 1990, Rationality and Society, V2, P94
[10]  
Coles J.L., 2013, CALCULATION COMPENSA, DOI [10.2139/ssrn.2296381, DOI 10.2139/SSRN.2296381]