The pricing strategies under the online platform selling mode with information sharing

被引:1
作者
Cao, Xiaogang [1 ,2 ]
Yuan, Jing [3 ]
Wen, Hui [4 ]
Zhang, Cuiwei [3 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Text Univ, Sch Management, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[2] Wuhan Text Univ, Enterprise Decis Support Res Ctr, Key Res Base Humanities & Social Sci, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[3] Wuhan Text Univ, Sch Management, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[4] Hubei Univ Technol, Sch Sci, Wuhan, Peoples R China
关键词
Information sharing; Stackelberg game; Online platform; Pricing; SUPPLY CHAIN; IMPACT; MANUFACTURER;
D O I
10.1108/K-06-2022-0848
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
PurposeDifferent information sharing mechanisms and online platform information sharing to different charging models are compared and analyzed.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decisions.FindingsThe results show that: (1) the retailer's pricing strategy is the highest when both of them obtain information, while the manufacturer's pricing strategy is affected by the related attributes of different products, such as the sensitivity of consumers to product prices; (2) in the online platform sales model, the demand information data sharing owned by the online platform can bring more expected profits to the whole supply chain and the members of the supply chain, and the higher the accuracy of the information, the higher the expected profit; (3) when the cost of obtaining demand information is zero, that is, the online platform shares the information data about market demand free of charge, the retailer and manufacturer tend to obtain information; (4) for the online platform, charging a certain fee can achieve higher expected profits than free sharing.Originality/valueBased on the single platform online sales model, this paper uses the Stackelberg game model to study the demand information sharing and pricing decision of a manufacturer and a retailer selling products through the same online platform.
引用
收藏
页码:1181 / 1207
页数:27
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