Supposition and (Statistical) Models

被引：0

作者：

Dethier, Corey ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Hannover, Germany

来源：

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2023年 / 90卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/psa.2023.17

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

In a recent paper, Sprenger advances what he calls a "suppositional" answer to the question of why a Bayesian agent's degrees of belief should align with the probabilities found in statistical models. I show that Sprenger's account trades on an ambiguity between hypothetical and subjunctive suppositions and cannot succeed once we distinguish between the two.

引用

页码：744 / 749

页数：6

共 8 条

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