Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal

We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, $A$A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establish or indicate that it is true that one is intentionally doing $A$A. In this paper, I argue against this assumption, showing how it entails being in a Moore-paradoxical situation. I argue that if knowledge of intentionally doing $A$A were such that grounds for it must be truth-indicating, then one could always wonder, when doing $A$A, whether $A$A is for one a goal. However, just as wondering whether $p$p is true is incompatible with thinking that one believes $p$p, so wondering whether $A$A is for one a goal is incompatible with thinking that one is intentionally doing $A$A. We must allow, then, that one's knowledge of intentionally doing $A$A is itself a representation of $A$A as a goal to be accomplished, apt to be grounded by reasons for doing $A$A. I show that the first-personal character of knowledge of acting intentionally resides in its being practical rather than theoretical.