Comment letters;
corporate social responsibility;
investors' attention;
state ownership;
AGENCY COSTS;
MANAGEMENT;
FIRM;
ATTENTION;
PERFORMANCE;
DISCLOSURE;
GOVERNMENT;
BEHAVIOR;
D O I:
10.1080/1540496X.2022.2127316
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
How does regulatory oversight shape corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms spanning 2014 to 2019, we investigate the oversight role of stock exchanges by examining the effects of comment letters (CLs) on CSR. We find that receiving CLs positively correlates with the increment of CSR performance. Both investors' attention and state ownership moderate this relation positively. Additionally, the positive relation is more pronounced in the subsample in a weak legal environment. Taken together, we provide causal evidence that supports the oversight role of CLs and the impression management theory of CSR.