Unintended consequences of administrative decentralization on air pollution: evidence from county power expansion in China

被引:4
作者
You, Chen [1 ]
Zhang, Ziyan [2 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Inst Adm, 1000 Wenyi West Rd Hangzhou, Hangzhou 311121, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[2] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Publ Affairs, Hangzhou 310058, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
关键词
Administrative decentralization; Counties power expansion; Air pollution; Resource input; Sustainable development; LOCAL-GOVERNMENT CONSOLIDATION; DIRECT-INVESTMENT EVIDENCE; QUASI-NATURAL EXPERIMENT; ECONOMIC-GROWTH EVIDENCE; ENVIRONMENTAL-REGULATION; MUNICIPAL AMALGAMATIONS; FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION; COMPETITION; REFORM; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1007/s11356-023-29403-x
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
How to reduce air pollution is an essential topic of environmental governance. Existing research has predominantly concentrated on the decentralization effect within the environmental field, leaving a gap in exploring non-environmental decentralization effects. This paper exploits a quasi-experiment of "counties power expansion (CPE)" reform in China to examine the effect of administrative decentralization on air pollution. Administrative decentralization will reorganize authority in economic and social matters and redistribute fiscal responsibility and resources for specific targets among multilevel governments. Employing a county-level dataset from 1999 to 2019 in China, we find that administrative decentralization significantly raises air pollution by about 2%. Our results further suggest that air pollution is mainly attributed to the increment of resource input and firm expansion. We find that geographical location will influence the air pollution effect. The policymaker should consider an inclusive intuitional design when launching administrative decentralization.
引用
收藏
页码:98271 / 98287
页数:17
相关论文
共 115 条
[1]   Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries [J].
Adam, Antonis ;
Delis, Manthos D. ;
Kammas, Pantelis .
ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 2014, 15 (01) :17-49
[2]   A Fresh Look at Municipal Consolidation in Australia [J].
Aulich, Chris ;
Sansom, Graham ;
McKinlay, Peter .
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES, 2014, 40 (01) :1-20
[3]   How much should we trust staggered difference-in-differences estimates? * [J].
Baker, Andrew C. ;
Larcker, David F. ;
Wang, Charles C. Y. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 144 (02) :370-395
[4]  
Baumol W.J., 1988, The Theory of Environmental Policy, V2nd, DOI DOI 10.1017/CBO9781139173513
[5]   Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States [J].
Beck, Thorsten ;
Levine, Ross ;
Levkov, Alexey .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2010, 65 (05) :1637-1667
[6]   Can labor regulation hinder economic performance? Evidence from India [J].
Besley, T ;
Burgess, R .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2004, 119 (01) :91-134
[7]   Voter turnout and municipal amalgamations-evidence from Denmark [J].
Bhatti, Yosef ;
Hansen, Kasper M. .
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES, 2019, 45 (05) :697-723
[8]   FLEXIBLE WAGES, BARGAINING, AND THE GENDER GAP [J].
Biasi, Barbara ;
Sarsons, Heather .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2022, 137 (01) :215-266
[9]   Efficacy of Command-and-Control and Market-Based Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries [J].
Blackman, Allen ;
Li, Zhengyan ;
Liu, Antung A. .
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESOURCE ECONOMICS, VOL 10, 2018, 10 :381-404
[10]   Creative accounting or creative destruction? Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing [J].
Brandt, Loren ;
Van Biesebroeck, Johannes ;
Zhang, Yifan .
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2012, 97 (02) :339-351