Who votes for free trade and when? Geopolitics as the source of legislative preferences on free trade agreements

被引:0
作者
Kim, Sung Eun [1 ]
Yang, Joonseok [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Korea Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Seoul 02841, South Korea
[2] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Polit Sci & Diplomacy, Seoul, South Korea
[3] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Polit Sci & Diplomacy, 25-2 Sungkyunkwan Ro,Myeongnyun 3 Sam Ga Dong, Seoul 03063, South Korea
基金
新加坡国家研究基金会;
关键词
free trade agreement; congress; legislative voting; international political economy; security externality; HOUSE-OF-REPRESENTATIVES; INTERNATIONAL-TRADE; PROTECTIONIST BIAS; BILATERAL TRADE; FACTOR MOBILITY; FOREIGN-POLICY; POLITICS; COMMERCE; INTERDEPENDENCE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1080/09692290.2022.2144927
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Why do legislators support some free trade agreements but oppose others? Despite a wide variation in legislative support for free trade agreements, the heterogeneous preferences of legislators have received little attention in the literature, which largely focuses on general trade policy preferences of legislators and individual voters. We bring in geopolitical factors as a key source of legislative preferences on specific free trade agreements. Using voting records of the U.S. House representatives on all major bills related to free trade agreements, we find that the geostrategic importance of potential trading partner has a substantial effect on voting for trade agreements. We find that legislators become less sensitive to their constituents' economic interests when considering trade agreements with allies or countries with closely aligned interests. This highlights the importance of examining security externalities of trade cooperation.
引用
收藏
页码:2257 / 2284
页数:28
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