Executive compensation in Europe: realized gains from stock-based pay

Shareholder value ideology and the rise of executive pay are widely acknowledged but only partly explored aspects of financialization. This paper adds to the empirical evidence on the extent to which stock-based pay incentivizes and rewards corporate executives, demonstrating that CEO pay, and hence pay inequality, is substantially under-stated in Europe. It shows that the actual realized gains (that is, take-home compensation) from stock-based pay of CEOs in the largest European companies are underestimated by the use of 'fair value' measures, in the case of some countries dramatically. We base our work on a sample of 301 large, publicly-traded companies listed in the S&P Europe 350 index from 11 EU countries. We document that on average half of the total compensation of the European CEOs in our sample is stock-based, measured by actual realized gains, with differences among countries. Based on our work, we argue that realized gains measures of CEO pay should be the standard for assessing the incentives and rewards of senior corporate executives in Europe. We consider this to be a preliminary step to question shareholder value-based corporate strategies in Europe.