inconsistent information structure;
maximum principle;
multiplicative noise system;
open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium;
stochastic nonzero-sum game;
NETWORKED CONTROL-SYSTEMS;
FEEDBACK-CONTROL;
D O I:
10.1002/oca.3055
中图分类号:
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号:
0812 ;
摘要:
In this article, the local and remote stochastic nonzero-sum game for a multiplicative noise system with inconsistent information is investigated, in which the multiplicative noise can cause nonlinear characteristics of linear systems, making it difficult to solve the optimal linear feedback Nash equilibrium. For the considered local and remote stochastic nonzero-sum game, the local player and the remote player obtain different information sets, which leads to inconsistent information between the two players. The goal is that each player is desired to minimize their own cost function. Our approach is based on a combination of orthogonal decomposition and completing square techniques, which allow us to derive a set of coupled Riccati equations that characterize the optimal feedback explicit (closed-loop) Nash equilibrium. The contributions of this article are summarized as follows. First, the optimal open-loop Nash equilibrium is obtained in terms of the forward and backward stochastic difference equations (FBSDEs) by adopting the Pontryagin maximum principle. Second, the closed-loop Nash equilibrium of this local and remote stochastic nonzero-sum game for a multiplicative noise system with inconsistent information is obtained by using the orthogonal decomposition methods. Finally, a simulation example is given to illustrate the validity of theoretical results and discuss potential extensions to more complex systems. In this paper, the local and remote stochastic nonzero-sum game for a multiplicative noise system with inconsistent information is investigated, in which the multiplicative noise can cause nonlinear characteristics of linear systems. For the considered local and remote stochastic nonzero-sum game, the local player and the remote player obtain different information sets. The optimal open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback explicit (closed-loop) Nash equilibrium are derived by using the maximum principle and the orthogonal decomposition method.image
机构:
Shandong Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Zibo 255000, Peoples R China
Shandong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Elect Engn & Automat, Qingdao 266590, Peoples R ChinaShandong Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Zibo 255000, Peoples R China
Lin, Yaning
Jiang, Xiushan
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h-index: 0
机构:
South China Univ Technol, Sch Automat Sci & Engn, Guangzhou 510641, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaShandong Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Zibo 255000, Peoples R China
Jiang, Xiushan
Zhang, Weihai
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机构:
Shandong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Elect Engn & Automat, Qingdao 266590, Peoples R ChinaShandong Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Zibo 255000, Peoples R China
机构:
Univ Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa RicaUniv Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa Rica
Meneses, H.
Cambronero, K.
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa RicaUniv Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa Rica
Cambronero, K.
Louzao, J.
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa RicaUniv Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa Rica
Louzao, J.
Arrieta, O.
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机构:
Univ Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa RicaUniv Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa Rica
Arrieta, O.
Vilanova, R.
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机构:
Univ Autonoma Barcelona, Dept Telecomunicaci & Engn Sistemes, Barcelona 08193, SpainUniv Costa Rica, Fac Ingn, Inst Invest Ingn, San Jose 115012060, Costa Rica
Vilanova, R.
2022 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ACCREDITATION OF ENGINEERING AND COMPUTING EDUCATION, ICACIT,
2022,