PUBLIC DEBT BUBBLES IN HETEROGENEOUS AGENT MODELS WITH TAIL RISK

被引:4
|
作者
Kocherlakota, Narayana R. R. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
POLICY;
D O I
10.1111/iere.12613
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article studies the public debt implications of an analytically tractable class of incomplete insurance macroeconomic models in which agents face a near-zero probability of a highly adverse outcome. In generic models of this kind, there exists a public debt bubble, so that the real interest rate is perpetually below the growth rate (set to zero). There is no upper bound on the deficit level or debt level that is sustainable in a bubbly equilibrium. In a public debt bubble, ex ante steady-state welfare is higher if the government chooses policies that give rise to a larger level of debt.
引用
收藏
页码:491 / 509
页数:19
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