Resale value guaranteed strategy, information sharing and electric vehicles adoption

被引:10
作者
Zhang, Xiang [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Zhao, Chenguang [1 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management & Econ, 5 Zhong Guan Cun South St, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[2] Sustainable Dev Res Inst Econ & Soc Beijing, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[3] Beijing Key Lab Energy Econ & Environm Management, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[4] Beijing Inst Technol, Ctr Energy & Environm Policy Res, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Electric vehicle; Resale anxiety; Resale value guaranteed; Information sharing; Decision reliability; MONEY-BACK GUARANTEES; SUPPLY CHAIN; INCENTIVE POLICIES; QUALITY; RETURNS; CHANNEL; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1007/s10479-020-03901-4
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
A resale value guaranteed (RVG) strategy has emerged as a novel way to alleviate EV purchasers' resale anxiety. However, certain questions, such as when to initiate a RVG strategy and whether to share information with supply chain partners, are unanswered. In this study, we aim to investigate the impacts of a RVG strategy and reliability of a RVG decision on EV adoption and supply chain performance. We develop analytical models to analyze the optimal RVG strategy in asymmetric versus symmetric information situations, using the traditional business model as a benchmark. The results indicate that a RVG strategy can be an effective way to increase supply chain profits for products that are subject to a degree of resale anxiety, trade-in cost, and the reliability of the manufacturer's commitments. Incentives provided by one party to the other can be utilized to encourage information sharing. However, information sharing does not necessarily lead to higher sales volume.
引用
收藏
页码:603 / 617
页数:15
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