From Moral Realism to Axiarchism: A Metaphysical Response to the Debunking Challenge

Moral realism faces a well known genealogical debunking challenge. I argue that the moral realist's best response may involve abandoning metaphysical naturalism in favor of some form of axiarchism-the view, very roughly, that the natural world is "ordered to the good." Axiarchism comes in both theistic and non -theistic forms, but all forms agree that the natural world exists and has certain basic features because it is good for it to exist and have those features. I argue that theistic and non -theistic forms of axiarchism are better positioned than metaphysical naturalism to avoid two commitments that a moral realist should seek to avoid: that the correctness of our moral beliefs is a major coincidence, and that there is a complete explanation of our moral beliefs that does not mention any moral truths.