On the pure theory of wage dispersion

被引：2

作者：

Wang, Cheng ^{[1
]}

Yang, Youzhi ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China

[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Adv Res, Shanghai, Peoples R China

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS | 2023年 / 47卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Wage dispersion; Search; On-the-job search; Dynamic contracting; REPEATED MORAL HAZARD; LABOR-MARKET; INFORMATION; UNEMPLOYMENT; INSURANCE; CONTRACTS; MODELS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.red.2022.02.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study an equilibrium model of the labor market with identical firms and homogeneous workers, and with search and on-the-job search. Jobs are dynamic contracts that allow firms to match the worker's outside offers or let the job be terminated. For a non -degenerate distribution of wage offers to arise in the environment, it is necessary and sufficient that (i) there is a positive cost of job turnover, in terminating an existing job or posting a new one; and (ii) there is asymmetric information regarding the worker's outside offers. The model is calibrated to the U.S. labor market to match observed worker flows and the observed mean-min ratio in wages earned. The calibrated model predicts a unimodal distribution for both wages offered and wages earned.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：246 / 277

页数：32

共 39 条

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