Takeover deterrence with state ownership: Evidence from China

被引：3
|
作者：
Su, Zhiwei [1 ]
Xue, Yi [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Macau, Fac Business Adm, Macau 999078, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Int Business & Econ, Chaoyang 100029, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2023年 / 146卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Deterrence; Privatization; State-owned enterprises; Takeover; PRIVATIZATION; MANAGEMENT; DEFENSES; RIGHTS; STOCK; LAW;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106689
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This study examines the role of Chinese state ownership in deterring takeovers. We document state own-ership's reduction in firms' susceptibility to potential takeovers. Using staggered privatization of the state-owned shareholders of public firms, as shocks to the deterrent effect of the state, we find that state-owned shareholders can insulate their portfolio firms from potential takeovers. The deterrent effect of state ownership is concentrated in strategic industries and well-functioning assets, alleviating managerial short-termism.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：15
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