Political Promotion Incentives and Firm Risk: Evidence from State-owned Enterprises in China

被引：6
作者：
Hu, Yiming [1 ]
Li, Wen [2 ]
Zhang, Aiping [1 ]
机构：
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, 1954 Huashan RD, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Business Sch, Fac Profess Finance & Accountancy, Shanghai, Peoples R China
来源：
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE | 2023年 / 59卷 / 01期
关键词：
Political promotion incentives; tournament incentives; firm risk; state-owned enterprises; PAY GAP EVIDENCE; PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; TOURNAMENT INCENTIVES; POLICY BURDENS; TOP MANAGEMENT; COMPENSATION; TURNOVER; SOES;
D O I：
10.1080/1540496X.2022.2095899
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Top executives in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China can be promoted to government sectors. This is regarded as political promotion. Using hand-collected turnover data for top executives in SOEs and adopting a time-varying difference-in-differences design, we find that firm risk is significantly lower in the years immediately before the political promotion of top executives, when their incentives for political promotions are stronger. Moreover, strong industry tournament incentives counteract the impact of political promotion incentives on firm risk. This study supplements tournament theory and enhances our understanding of how different incentive mechanisms interact and affect firms' choices vis-a-vis their risk-taking activities.
引用
收藏
页码：156 / 169
页数：14
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