Director self-dealing: Evidence from compensation peer groups

被引:2
作者
Frye, Melissa B. [1 ]
Gatchev, Vladimir A. [1 ]
Pham, Duong T. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cent Florida, 12744 Pegasus Dr, Orlando, FL 32816 USA
[2] Georgia Southern Univ, Statesboro, GA 30460 USA
关键词
Board compensation; Board incentives; Peer selection; Agency; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; CHOICE; LUCK; PAY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102560
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We find that director pay, especially the equity-based portion, is positively related to peer firms' director pay, suggesting boards benchmark when establishing their own compensation. Such benchmarking is distinct from peer benchmarking in CEO pay. We also find a significant bias in peer selection towards peers with relatively high director pay, which helps increase board pay. Peer benchmarking of director compensation is more (less) pronounced in firms with low (high) involvement by institutional investors and firms with declining (increasing) profitability. Overall, our results are consistent with directors engaging in self-dealing when selecting compensation peers, without clear benefits to the firm.
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页数:22
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