What explains collective action: The impact of social capital, incentive structures and economic benefits

被引:0
作者
Skreli, Engjell [1 ]
Xhoxhi, Orjon [1 ]
Imami, Drini [1 ,2 ,3 ,5 ,6 ]
Rama, Klodjan [4 ]
机构
[1] Agr Univ Tirana, Fac Econ & Agribusiness, Tirana, Albania
[2] Hsch Rhein Waal, Kleve, Germany
[3] CERGE EI, Prague, Czech Republic
[4] Gesell Internatl Zusammenarbeit GIZ, Tirana, Albania
[5] Agr Univ Tirana, Fac Econ & Agribusiness, Tirana, Albania
[6] Kleve Germany & CERGE EI, Hsch Rhein Waal, Prague, Czech Republic
关键词
Albania; collective action; collective action benefits; incentive structures; leadership; power; reciprocity; FARMERS COOPERATIVES; PRODUCER GROUPS; DETERMINANTS; COORDINATION; RECIPROCITY; TRANSITION; MEMBERSHIP; PUNISHMENT; EVOLUTION; PROVISION;
D O I
10.1002/jid.3873
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This study focuses in testing the power of reciprocity and leadership as collective action incentive structures and cooperation economic benefits in explaining collective action initiation in the context of a post-communist transition economy. The paper is based on a structured survey targeting Albanian export-oriented farmers. Different from most previous studies, this paper uses both regression analysis and machine learning procedure which is better suited for analysing non-linear relationships. The empirical findings are at odds with common sense that non-cooperation is the dominant strategy, because the presence of tolerant reciprocators and leadership resources provide promising incentive structures for collective action development.
引用
收藏
页码:1622 / 1646
页数:25
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