Evolutionary Game Analysis of Providers' and Demanders' Low-Carbon Cooperation in Cloud Manufacturing Mode

被引:0
|
作者
Han, Tiaojuan [1 ]
Lu, Jianfeng [1 ]
Zhang, Hao [1 ]
Gao, Wentao [1 ]
机构
[1] Tongji Univ, CIMS Res Ctr, Shanghai 201804, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
manufacturing service; low-carbon cooperation; evolutionary game; regulation; STRATEGIES;
D O I
10.3390/su16062335
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
The low-carbon cooperation between providers and demanders is one of the ways to achieve sustainable development in cloud manufacturing, which has become an important issue. However, the effective ways for the cloud platform to encourage such cooperation are unclear. Considering the low-carbon strategies of the supply and demand sides and the regulation of the cloud platform, an evolutionary game model involving service providers, service demanders, and the cloud platform is established, and the tripartite evolutionary stability is discussed. Further, the impacts of important factors, such as regulatory costs, on the tripartite strategies are analyzed through numerical simulation. The results illustrate that the cloud platform reasonably optimizes the rewards and penalties for low-carbon cooperation to promote the enthusiastic participation of service providers and demanders. The cloud platform can set penalties (rewards) for providers based on their low-carbon costs and rewards (penalties). Additionally, the low-carbon costs of service providers and the additional costs of demanders negatively affect the low-carbon cooperation between providers and demanders. Meanwhile, the low-carbon costs and additional costs for the providers and demanders to engage in low-carbon cooperation are affected by the rewards and penalties of the cloud platform. The results could provide insights into the game decisions of the supply and demand sides and the cloud platform, facilitating sustainable supply chain advancement.
引用
收藏
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Co-evolution analysis of low-carbon cooperation between service providers and demanders
    Han, Tiaojuan
    Lu, Jianfeng
    Zhang, Hao
    Zhang, Kaiyu
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2025, 490
  • [2] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three-Player for Low-Carbon Production Capacity Sharing
    Zhao, Daozhi
    Hao, Jiaqin
    Cao, Cejun
    Han, Hongshuai
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2019, 11 (11)
  • [3] An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Private Charging Pile Behavior in Low-Carbon Urban Traffic
    Zhu, Lequn
    Zhou, Ran
    Li, Xiaojun
    Zhang, Linlin
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2023, 15 (13)
  • [4] Evolutionary game theoretic analysis on low-carbon strategy for supply chain enterprises
    Kang, Kai
    Zhao, Yujie
    Zhang, Jing
    Qiang, Chen
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2019, 230 : 981 - 994
  • [5] Analysis of low-carbon technology transfer strategies based on a quadrilateral evolutionary game
    Zou, Chen
    Huang, Yongchun
    Ye, Zi
    Qian, Xinyi
    ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2024, 138
  • [6] Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Approach for Low-Carbon Power Grid Technology Cooperation With Government Intervention
    Zhao, Xin
    Bai, Yu
    Ding, Lili
    Wang, Lei
    IEEE ACCESS, 2020, 8 : 47357 - 47369
  • [7] Low-carbon transition pathways in the context of carbon-neutral: A quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis
    Tian, Tingting
    Sun, Shuhui
    JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 2022, 322
  • [8] The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Emission Reduction and Promotion in Low-Carbon Supply Chains
    Yuan, Baiyun
    He, Longfei
    Gu, Bingmei
    Zhang, Yi
    APPLIED SCIENCES-BASEL, 2018, 8 (10):
  • [9] Carbon Offsetting-Driven Multi-Actor Low-Carbon Collaborative Evolutionary Game Analysis
    Zhou, Ziao
    Li, Yuan
    Zhang, Yongli
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2023, 15 (12)
  • [10] Evolutionary game analysis on the selection of green and low carbon innovation between manufacturing enterprises
    Chen, Hongmei
    Wang, Jianxue
    Miao, Yujun
    ALEXANDRIA ENGINEERING JOURNAL, 2021, 60 (02) : 2139 - 2147