Identification in english auctions with shill bidding

被引：0

作者：

Marshall, Guillermo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC, Canada

来源：

QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS | 2024年 / 22卷 / 02期

关键词：

Auctions; Partial identification; Shill bidding; eBay; RESERVE PRICES; INFERENCE; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.

引用

页码：193 / 222

页数：30

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