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Identification in english auctions with shill bidding
被引:0
作者:
Marshall, Guillermo
[1
]
机构:
[1] Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC, Canada
来源:
QME-QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND ECONOMICS
|
2024年
/
22卷
/
02期
关键词:
Auctions;
Partial identification;
Shill bidding;
eBay;
RESERVE PRICES;
INFERENCE;
MODEL;
D O I:
10.1007/s11129-023-09274-9
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
What can we learn from auction data when the seller submits shill bids to inflate the auction price? I study identification in an incomplete model of an English auction with shill bidding in the context of independent private values. I show that the distribution of valuations is partially identified (as is the optimal reserve price), and I provide bounds for the distribution of valuations that hold even when the seller is not engaging in shill bidding. I apply these results to a sample of eBay auctions.
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页码:193 / 222
页数:30
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