Does the Shareholding Proportion of Large Shareholders Affect the Horizontal Organizational Structure? Evidence from Listed Companies in China

被引:1
作者
Lei, Qianhua [1 ]
Zhang, Qiao [1 ]
Chen, Huili [2 ]
机构
[1] South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Guangdong Univ Finance, Sch Accounting, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Horizontal organizational structure; large shareholders; shareholding proportion of large shareholders; subsidiary numbers; G32; G34; M13; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; BUSINESS GROUPS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; PARTY TRANSACTIONS; ENTRENCHMENT; MARKET; INVESTMENT; SEPARATION; EARNINGS; MERGERS;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2023.2270136
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines how the shareholding proportion of large shareholders affects the horizontal organizational structure of business groups. We empirically find that as the shareholding proportion of large shareholders increases, the number of subsidiaries decreases, which provides evidence of the alignment effect and risk aversion of large shareholders. Our results are robust to various robustness tests. The mechanism tests further verify the alignment effect and risk aversion of large shareholders, showing that as ownership becomes more concentrated, large shareholders tend to reduce agency problems and avoid risks. This study enhances the understanding of horizontal expansion in pyramidal organizational structures.
引用
收藏
页码:1106 / 1117
页数:12
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