Agency Cost of Debt and Inside Debt: The Role of CEO Overconfidence

被引：10

作者：

Galariotis, Emilios ^{[1
]}

Louca, Christodoulos ^{[2
]}

Petmezas, Dimitris ^{[3
]}

Wang, Shuhui ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Audencia Business Sch, 8 Route Joneliere, F-44312 Nantes, France

[2] Cyprus Univ Technol, Dept Commerce Finance & Shipping, CY-3036 Limassol, Cyprus

[3] Univ Durham, Durham Univ Business Sch, Durham DH1 3LB, England

[4] Univ Surrey, Surrey Business Sch, Guildford GU2 7XH, Surrey, England

来源：

BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT | 2023年 / 34卷 / 03期

关键词：

SELF-SERVING BIASES; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL; INVESTMENT; ACQUISITIONS; ATTRIBUTION; RISK; FIRM; PAY;

D O I：

10.1111/1467-8551.12661

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study extends our understanding of CEO inside debt compensation under an agency problem perspective by considering the impact of a behavioural trait, namely CEO overconfidence. Using a sample of US firms in Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the period 2006-2019, we find that overconfident CEOs exhibit greater inside debt incentives (i.e. incentives arising from defined-benefit pensions and deferred compensation). This relationship is more pronounced among firms with higher CEO overconfidence-induced agency cost of debt (e.g. financially unconstrained firms) managed by CEOs who are less able to align compensation with their own preferences (e.g. less powerful CEOs). The results are robust to endogeneity, self-selection concerns and alternative explanations. We contribute to the inside compensation literature that deals with agency problems under overconfident CEOs, and optimal contracting and managerial power theories.

引用

页码：1606 / 1631

页数：26

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