On the Full Concretion of Subjectivity in Husserl's Phenomenology: Contingency and the Transcendental Person

This paper argues that Husserl's personalist ethics provides a new way to understand the meaning of the full concretion of the transcendental ego in his mature phenomenology. Husserl's late ethics introduces, at the core of his thinking, a notion of contingency that he associates with irrationality and facticity. This central aspect of human life, namely that contingency traverses it through and through and which ethics makes painfully visible, is usually obscured by the phenomenological attitude, insofar as the phenomenological reduction brackets all matters of fact. Yet the concrete is not the same as the factual, for Husserl. This paper shows that, when fully concretely understood, the transcendental ego is a person who is correlated to a practical world, whose life as a whole has a personal style, and who struggles against what Husserl calls the contingency of destiny.