Reactive means in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma

被引:1
|
作者
Molnar, Grant [1 ]
Hammond, Caroline [1 ,3 ]
Fu, Feng [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Math, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[2] Geisel Sch Med Dartmouth, Dept Biomed Data Sci, Lebanon, NH 03756 USA
[3] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Math, 27 N Main St,6188 Kemeny Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
Game theory; Fairness; Morality; Direct reciprocity; Applied probability; STRATEGIES; EVOLUTION; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2023.128201
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is a well studied framework for understanding di-rect reciprocity and cooperation in pairwise encounters. However, measuring the morality of various IPD strategies is still largely lacking. Here, we partially address this issue by proposing a suit of plausible morality metrics to quantify four aspects of justice. We focus our closed-form calculation on the class of reactive strategies because of their mathemati-cal tractability and expressive power. We define reactive means as a tool for studying how actors in the IPD and Iterated Snowdrift Game (ISG) behave under typical circumstances. We compute reactive means for four functions intended to capture human intuitions about "goodness" and "fair play". Two of these functions are strongly anticorrelated with success in the IPD and ISG, and the other two are weakly anticorrelated with success. Our results will aid in evaluating and comparing powerful IPD strategies based on machine learning algorithms, using simple and intuitive morality metrics.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] CONTRITION DOES NOT ENSURE COOPERATION IN THE ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
    Hilbe, Christian
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BIFURCATION AND CHAOS, 2009, 19 (11): : 3877 - 3885
  • [42] Older and younger adults' interactions with friends and strangers in an iterated prisoner's dilemma
    Mienaltowski, Andrew
    Wichman, Aaron L.
    AGING NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITION, 2020, 27 (02) : 153 - 172
  • [43] Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy
    Chen, Bo
    Zhang, Bin
    Wu, Hua-qing
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE, 2015, 46 (01) : 31 - 43
  • [44] A Theoretical Analysis of Temporal Difference Learning in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
    Naoki Masuda
    Hisashi Ohtsuki
    Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 2009, 71 : 1818 - 1850
  • [45] Using Misperception to Counteract Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
    Brumley, Lachlan
    Korb, Kevin B.
    Kopp, Carlo
    ARTIFICIAL LIFE: BORROWING FROM BIOLOGY, PROCEEDINGS, 2009, 5865 : 53 - 62
  • [46] Understanding representational sensitivity in the iterated prisoner's dilemma with fingerprints
    Ashlock, Daniel
    Kim, Eun-Youn
    Leahy, Nicole
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS PART C-APPLICATIONS AND REVIEWS, 2006, 36 (04): : 464 - 475
  • [47] The evolution of punishment and apology: an iterated prisoner's dilemma model
    Okamoto, K
    Matsumura, S
    EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY, 2000, 14 (08) : 703 - 720
  • [48] The evolution of punishment and apology: an iterated prisoner's dilemma model
    Kyoko Okamoto
    Shuichi Matsumura
    Evolutionary Ecology, 2000, 14 : 703 - 720
  • [49] Evolutionary Optimization of Cooperative Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
    Finocchiaro, Jessie
    Mathias, H. David
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON GAMES, 2021, 13 (02) : 170 - 179
  • [50] Human friendship favours cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
    Majolo, Bonaventura
    Ames, Kaye
    Brumpton, Rachel
    Garratt, Rebecca
    Hall, Kate
    Wilson, Natasha
    BEHAVIOUR, 2006, 143 : 1383 - 1395