Reactive means in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma

被引:1
|
作者
Molnar, Grant [1 ]
Hammond, Caroline [1 ,3 ]
Fu, Feng [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Math, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[2] Geisel Sch Med Dartmouth, Dept Biomed Data Sci, Lebanon, NH 03756 USA
[3] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Math, 27 N Main St,6188 Kemeny Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
Game theory; Fairness; Morality; Direct reciprocity; Applied probability; STRATEGIES; EVOLUTION; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2023.128201
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is a well studied framework for understanding di-rect reciprocity and cooperation in pairwise encounters. However, measuring the morality of various IPD strategies is still largely lacking. Here, we partially address this issue by proposing a suit of plausible morality metrics to quantify four aspects of justice. We focus our closed-form calculation on the class of reactive strategies because of their mathemati-cal tractability and expressive power. We define reactive means as a tool for studying how actors in the IPD and Iterated Snowdrift Game (ISG) behave under typical circumstances. We compute reactive means for four functions intended to capture human intuitions about "goodness" and "fair play". Two of these functions are strongly anticorrelated with success in the IPD and ISG, and the other two are weakly anticorrelated with success. Our results will aid in evaluating and comparing powerful IPD strategies based on machine learning algorithms, using simple and intuitive morality metrics.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:16
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