Local officials' political capital and poverty alleviation

被引:0
作者
Wang, Shubin [1 ]
Li, Qiang [1 ]
Gu, Yan [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Coll Int Trade, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[2] Fudan Univ, Coll Fanhai Int Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Fudan Univ, Coll Fanhai Int Finance, 220 Handan Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
来源
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OF ECONOMICS | 2023年 / 18卷 / 03期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
agricultural development; capacity constrains alleviation; county party secretary; fiscal expenditure; political capital; poverty alleviation; CHINA; PATRONAGE; NETWORKS;
D O I
10.1002/ise3.46
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examined the effect of local officials' political capital on poverty alleviation by using a manually compiled database of county party secretaries (CPSs) in impoverished counties in China. The empirical results reveal that CPSs with political capital positively affect poverty alleviation. Mechanism tests indicated that CPSs with political capital contribute to greater agricultural and financial development, attract more enterprise investment, and increase fiscal expenditure. The promotional effect of local officials' political capital on poverty alleviation was influenced by CPSs' characteristics (e.g., tenure, education level, and age) and was less pronounced during central government inspection and when the provincial government was less concerned about local officials' poverty alleviation. Our results suggest that local officials' political capital can alleviate poverty in emerging economies.
引用
收藏
页码:351 / 369
页数:19
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