Short-term subsidy strategy for new users of ride-hailing platform with user base

被引：9
作者：
Zhang, Qi [1 ]
Liu, Yang [2 ]
Fan, Zhi-Ping [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Northeastern Univ, Sch Business Adm, Dept Informat Management & Decis Sci, Shenyang 110169, Peoples R China
[2] Dalian Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Dalian 116024, Peoples R China
[3] Northeastern Univ, State Key Lab Synthet Automat Proc Ind, Shenyang 110819, Peoples R China
来源：
COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING | 2023年 / 179卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Ride-hailing platform; Short-term subsidy; User base; Network externality; Social welfare; PRICING POLICY SELECTION; 2-SIDED MARKETS; COMPETITION; SERVICES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.cie.2023.109177
中图分类号：
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号：
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要：
Short-term subsidy strategy for new passengers and drivers (hereafter strategy S) has been frequently adopted by ride-hailing platforms. However, how to set the suitable subsidy is still unclear. This paper examines the strategy S of ride-hailing platform(s) in the monopoly and duopoly markets, respectively. The results show that adopting strategy S is profitable for the ride-hailing platform when the user base of either passengers or drivers is small in the monopoly market. In the duopoly market, adopting strategy S is profitable for the ride-hailing platform when the user bases of both passengers and drivers are small. Moreover, in the monopoly and duopoly markets, adopting strategy S cannot effectively increase social welfare when the user bases of both passengers and drivers are large.
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页数：10
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