Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information

被引：0

作者：

Einy, Ezra ^{[1
]}

Haimanko, Ori ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, Beer Sheva, Israel

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2023年 / 140卷

关键词：

Bayesian games; Bayesian potential; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Continuous payoffs; Absolute continuity of information; Purification; EXISTENCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games with absolutely continuous information and a Bayesian potential that is upper semi -continuous in actions for any realization of the players' types. In particular, all Bayesian potential games with finitely many actions and absolutely continuous information possess a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：341 / 347

页数：7

共 23 条

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