Judging the difficulty of perceptual decisions

被引:0
作者
Loeffler, Anne [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Zylberberg, Ariel [1 ,2 ]
Shadlen, Michael [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Wolpert, Daniel [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Zuckerman Mind Brain Behav Inst, New York, NY 10032 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Dept Neurosci, New York, NY 10032 USA
[3] Columbia Univ, Kavli Inst Brain Sci, New York, NY USA
[4] Columbia Univ, Howard Hughes Med Inst, New York, NY USA
来源
ELIFE | 2023年 / 12卷
基金
美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
decision making; difficulty judgments; sequentail sampling; Human; BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION; CONFIDENCE; REPRESENTATION; JUDGMENTS; ACCURACY; CHOICE; TASKS;
D O I
10.7554/eLife.86892
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Deciding how difficult it is going to be to perform a task allows us to choose between tasks, allocate appropriate resources, and predict future performance. To be useful for planning, difficulty judgments should not require completion of the task. Here, we examine the processes underlying difficulty judgments in a perceptual decision-making task. Participants viewed two patches of dynamic random dots, which were colored blue or yellow stochastically on each appearance. Stimulus coherence (the probability, p(blue), of a dot being blue) varied across trials and patches thus establishing difficulty, |p(blue) -0.5|. Participants were asked to indicate for which patch it would be easier to decide the dominant color. Accuracy in difficulty decisions improved with the difference in the stimulus difficulties, whereas the reaction times were not determined solely by this quantity. For example, when the patches shared the same difficulty, reaction times were shorter for easier stimuli. A comparison of several models of difficulty judgment suggested that participants compare the absolute accumulated evidence from each stimulus and terminate their decision when they differed by a set amount. The model predicts that when the dominant color of each stimulus is known, reaction times should depend only on the difference in difficulty, which we confirm empirically. We also show that this model is preferred to one that compares the confidence one would have in making each decision. The results extend evidence accumulation models, used to explain choice, reaction time, and confidence to prospective judgments of difficulty.
引用
收藏
页数:27
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