Board Interlocks Corporate Social Responsibility Violations Reputation;
REPUTATIONAL PENALTIES;
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS;
DIRECTOR INTERLOCKS;
EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS;
FIRM PERFORMANCE;
MEDIA COVERAGE;
IRRESPONSIBILITY;
GOVERNANCE;
MANAGEMENT;
UNCERTAINTY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jfs.2023.101162
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) misconduct often negatively impacts firms and damages their reputation. Using data on U.S. listed firms from 2002 to 2018, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to establish board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance after a CSR-related violation than with other firms. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced in violating firms that have a greater incentive to maintain their reputation than in other firms. We also find that the capital market and the media react positively to board interlock announcements by violating firms. However, we find no improvement in future CSR performance or a reduced likelihood of future CSR misconduct after the formation of such board interlocks. Altogether, our findings suggest that establishing board interlocks with firms that have better CSR performance is an effective signaling strategy for reputation management for firms engaging in CSR misconduct.
机构:
Univ Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, EnglandUniv Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, England
Cai, Xiangshang
Gao, Ning
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, EnglandUniv Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, England
Gao, Ning
论文数: 引用数:
h-index:
机构:
Garrett, Ian
Xu, Yan
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Inst Shareholders Serv ISS, London, EnglandUniv Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, England
机构:
Univ Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, EnglandUniv Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, England
Cai, Xiangshang
Gao, Ning
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, EnglandUniv Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, England
Gao, Ning
论文数: 引用数:
h-index:
机构:
Garrett, Ian
Xu, Yan
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Inst Shareholders Serv ISS, London, EnglandUniv Manchester, Alliance Manchester Business Sch, Accounting & Finance, Manchester, Lancs, England