Deduction, Abduction, and Creativity

被引:1
|
作者
Hanzal, Tomas [1 ]
机构
[1] Charles Univ Prague, Inst Philosophy & Religious Studies, Fac Arts, Prague, Czech Republic
来源
ACTA ANALYTICA-INTERNATIONAL PERIODICAL FOR PHILOSOPHY IN THE ANALYTICAL TRADITION | 2024年 / 39卷 / 01期
关键词
Deduction; Abduction; Creativity; Sherlock Holmes; Artificial intelligence; Logic of discovery; DISCOVERY;
D O I
10.1007/s12136-023-00555-2
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
In a discussion of Sherlock Holmes' "science of deduction" and the related "method of exclusion," I show that Holmes' claim that his inferences are deductive makes sense, if we consider his theoretical presuppositions. So, it is more accurate to say that he tries to reduce abduction to deduction than that he confuses them. His theoretical framework, albeit inadequate as a theory of empirical reasoning, can be seen as a basic model of classical (symbolic) AI. The main problems of this approach are surveyed, and abduction is brought into play as both a better characterization of Holmes' inferences and a better guide for building AI systems. This is a good background for raising the question of creativity because, according to Peirce, it relates to abduction in a substantial way. Is Sherlock Holmes creative? Can machines be creative? An affirmative answer to the second question might be given by a "logic of discovery" but the problem remains that inventing such a logic already presupposes creativity.
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页码:163 / 182
页数:20
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