Board informal hierarchy and firm innovation: Evidence from China

被引：4

作者：

Xue, Kunkun ^{[1
]}

Wu, Lidong ^{[2
,4
]}

Sun, Peipei ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Zhengzhou Univ, Business Sch, Zhengzhou, Henan, Peoples R China

[2] Nankai Univ, China Acad Corp Governance, Tianjin, Peoples R China

[3] Western Sydney Univ, Sch Business, Parramatta, Australia

[4] 94 Weijin Rd, Tianjin, Peoples R China

来源：

FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2023年 / 58卷

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Board informal hierarchy; Firm innovation; Board size; CEO's rank in informal hierarchy; Firm performance; Environmental dynamism; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; DIRECTORS; PERFORMANCE; POWER;

D O I：

10.1016/j.frl.2023.104557

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Using data from Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2021, we investigate how board informal hierarchy affects firm innovation. We find that: (1) Board informal hierarchy positively affects firm innovation. (2) The impact is positively moderated by board size and environmental dynamism and negatively moderated by CEO's rank in informal hierarchical and firm performance. (3) Board informal hierarchy based on external director positions, government experience, tenure, and gender have significant positive effects on firm innovation.

引用

页数：9

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