The distributive equity and the incentives to the private sector in reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation-plus

Distributive equity substantially impacts the success of reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation plus (REDD+). Therefore, if more private financing is to be attracted to REDD+, it is necessary to understand the effects of distributive equity on private investors' decision-making behavior. However, current studies have not examined the effect of distributive equity on the actions of stakeholders, including private investors. This study examines the actions of private investors and landowners under four distributive equity scenarios and their effect on the effectiveness of REDD+ within a theoretical framework that takes into account distributive equity in REDD+. In addition, a numerical illustration is used to compare the differences in the effects of equity preferences in the four scenarios. The results show that stakeholder equity preferences can enhance REDD+ effectiveness, suggesting that equity and effectiveness are not antagonistic. In addition, distributive equity may reduce the utility of private investors in REDD+, thus causing the incentives of the equity preference of private investors to become critical to the REDD+ policy design. Finally, the findings also show that the distributive equity mechanism in REDD+ depends on the spontaneous formation of stakeholders rather than on command and-control measures. Therefore, compared with other mechanisms, this distributive equity mechanism is more common and more likely to attract private investors.