Aristotelian Naturalism and the Imperfect Project of Normalizing Ethics

In this paper, I claim that the project of recovering an "ethics of normality" not only consists of the attempt to return metaphysical concepts to their everyday meaning but also is dedicated to the goal of developing a theory of the ethically self-evident that ultimately leaves things as they are. In contrast to competing ethical theories of deontology and consequentialism, Aristotelian naturalism, as a promising approach to the justification of virtue ethics, is able to provide a particular heuristic of ethical reservedness. For example, Aristotelian naturalism gives us good reasons to formulate objections to efforts to improve human nature - and even to make this improvement a moral imperative - or to implement educational programs that exceed the reasonable measure of what is ethically acceptable. In particular, I argue that the neo-Aristotelian concept of a person, expanded or grounded in the way just described, offers the appropriate basis for developing an innovative and integrative bioethical ontology of the human being.