Who detects and why: how do individual differences in cognitive characteristics underpin different types of responses to reasoning tasks?

被引:3
作者
Erceg, Nikola [1 ]
Galic, Zvonimir [1 ]
Bubic, Andreja [2 ]
Jelic, Dino [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zagreb, Fac Humanities & Social Sci, Zagreb 10000, Croatia
[2] Univ Split, Fac Humanities & Social Sci, Split, Croatia
关键词
Cognitive reflection; belief bias; conflict detection; individual differences; logical intuitions; DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES; REFLECTION TEST; CONFLICT DETECTION; TIME-COURSE; NUMERACY; BIAS; SENSITIVITY; EXTENSION; LITERACY; MODEL;
D O I
10.1080/13546783.2022.2108897
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
People can solve reasoning tasks in different ways depending on how much conflict they detected and whether they were accurate or not. The hybrid dual-process model presumes that these different types of responses correspond to different strengths of logical intuitions, with correct responses given with little conflict detection indicating very strong, and incorrect responses given with little conflict detection very weak logical intuitions. Across two studies, we observed that individual differences in abilities, skills, and dispositions underpinned these different response types, with correct non-detection trials being related to highest, and incorrect non-detection trials to lowest scores on these traits, both for cognitive reflection and belief-bias tasks. In sum, it seems that every individual difference variable that we measured was important for the development of strong logical intuitions, with numeracy and the need for cognition being especially important for intuitive correct responding to cognitive reflection tasks. In line with the hybrid dual-process model, we argue that abilities and dispositions serve primarily for developing mindware and strong intuitions, and not for detecting conflict, which has repercussions for the validity of these tasks as measures of reflection/analytical thinking.
引用
收藏
页码:594 / 642
页数:49
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