Dishonesty as a collective-risk social dilemma

被引：0
|
作者：
Jiang, Shuguang [1 ]
Villeval, Marie Claire [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Shandong Univ, Ctr Econ Res, Jinan, Shandong, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, Ecully, France
[3] Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, 93 Chemindes Mouilles, F-69130 Ecully, France
来源：
ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2024年 / 62卷 / 01期
关键词：
collective risk; dishonesty; experiment; group size; individualism; public bad; GROUP-SIZE; PUBLIC-GOODS; INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM; COOPERATION; PROVISION; POWER; POLITICIANS; PREFERENCES; DECEPTION; DIFFUSION;
D O I：
10.1111/ecin.13171
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We investigated lying as a collective-risk social dilemma. Misreporting resulted in increased individual earnings but when total claims reached a certain threshold, all group members were at risk of collective sanction, regardless of their individual behavior. Due to selfishness and miscoordination, most individuals earned less than the reservation payoff from honest reporting in the group. However, preferences for truth-telling lowered the risk of collective sanction in this setting compared to a social dilemma game in which players could make direct claims without lying. The risk of sanctions decreased with risk aversion and a smaller group size.
引用
收藏
页码：223 / 241
页数：19
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