Detection of false data injection attacks on power systems based on measurement-eigenvalue residual similarity test

被引:0
|
作者
Zhu, Yihua [1 ,2 ]
Liu, Ren [1 ,2 ]
Chang, Dongxu [3 ,4 ]
Guo, Hengdao [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] China Southern Power Grid, Elect Power Res Inst, State Key Lab HVDC, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[2] Natl Energy Power Grid Technol RD Ctr, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[3] Guangdong Prov Key Lab Intelligent Operat & Contro, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[4] China Southern Power Grid, Elect Power Res Inst, CSG Key Lab Power Syst Simulat, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
来源
FRONTIERS IN ENERGY RESEARCH | 2023年 / 11卷
关键词
false data injection attacks; AC state estimation; measurement-eigenvalue residual similarity; bad data detection; cyber security;
D O I
10.3389/fenrg.2023.1285317
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
Existing False data injection attack (FDIA) detection methods based on measurement similarity testing have difficulty in distinguishing between actual power grid accidents and FDIAs. Therefore, this paper proposes a detection method called the measurement-eigenvalue residual similarity (MERS) test, which can accurately detect FDIAs in AC state estimationof power system and effectively distinguish them from actual power grid accidents. Simulation results on the IEEE 39-bus system demonstrate that the proposed method achieves higher detection rates and lower false alarm rates than traditional methods under various operation conditions.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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