Collective versus individual interests: The varying effects of public goods and services on tax attitudes in Africa

被引:0
作者
Olawole, Ifeoluwa M. M. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ, Dept Govt, Washington, DC 20016 USA
[2] 45 Stephanie Dr, Bear, DE 19701 USA
关键词
African politics; fiscal exchange; political economy; public goods; service delivery; social capital; state building; trust; AUTHORITIES; TRUST; VOTE;
D O I
10.1111/ssqu.13307
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
ObjectiveTaxation is crucial for revenue, political participation, and the demand for accountability in Africa. Most existing theories do not predict tax attitudes in informal economies with weak institutional capacity nor do they demonstrate how service delivery translates to stronger tax regimes. This article examines the fiscal exchange theory- how government's expenditure affects voluntary compliance-across Africa, showing mechanisms through which service delivery affects tax morale. MethodsThe study uses a public opinion survey of over 41,000 respondents from 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The statistical analysis employs an ordered logit model and linear probability model to test the hypotheses. ResultsThe study finds that service delivery determines tax attitudes. In addition, the study examines aspects of service delivery that are of most concern to citizens and finds that services that cater to individual needs are stronger in inducing tax morale than those that address collective needs. The article also finds that citizens' acknowledgement of receipt of goods is not an indication of inherent incumbent support. ConclusionThis study sought to understand the relationship between different modes of service delivery and the likelihood of having tax morale among African citizens and ultimately sheds light upon citizen-state relationships, effective governance, and voluntary compliance.
引用
收藏
页码:1184 / 1201
页数:18
相关论文
共 39 条
[1]   TAX BARGAINING, FISCAL CONTRACTS, AND FISCAL CAPACITY IN GHANA: A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE [J].
Aboagye, Prince Young ;
Hillbom, Ellen .
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 2020, 119 (475) :177-202
[2]   PUBLIC SPENDING REALLOCATIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ACROSS DIFFERENT INCOME LEVELS [J].
Acosta-Ormaechea, Santiago ;
Morozumi, Atsuyoshi .
ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 2017, 55 (01) :98-114
[3]  
Afrobarometer Data, BENIN BOTSWANA BURKI
[4]   WHY DO PEOPLE PAY TAXES [J].
ALM, J ;
MCCLELLAND, GH ;
SCHULZE, WD .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1992, 48 (01) :21-38
[5]   The Origins of Voluntary Compliance: Attitudes toward Taxation in Urban Nigeria [J].
Bodea, Cristina ;
Lebas, Adrienne .
BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2016, 46 (01) :215-238
[6]   Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns [J].
Bratton, Michael .
ELECTORAL STUDIES, 2008, 27 (04) :621-632
[7]  
Brautigam DeborahA., 2008, Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent, DOI [10.1017/CBO9780511490897, DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511490897]
[8]   Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion [J].
Castaneda, Nestor ;
Doyle, David ;
Schwartz, Cassilde .
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 2020, 53 (07) :1175-1219
[9]  
DArcy Michelle, 2011, 126 AFR
[10]   The composition of public expenditure and economic growth [J].
Devarajan, S ;
Swaroop, V ;
Zou, HF .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 1996, 37 (02) :313-344