COOPERATION IN PROBLEMS OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCES

被引：0

作者：

Ordaz-Cuevas, Jesus Erubiel ^{[1
]}

Sanchez-Perez, Joss ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Siena, Dept Econ & Stat, Siena, Italy

[2] UASLP, Fac Econ, San Luis Potosi, San Luis Potosi, Mexico

来源：

JOURNAL OF DYNAMICS AND GAMES | 2023年 / 10卷 / 04期

关键词：

Common pool resources; cooperation; coalitions; games with external-ities; tragedy of the commons; SHAPLEY VALUE; PROPERTY; GAMES;

D O I：

10.3934/jdg.2023010

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

. In this work we study problems of common-pool resources from a cooperative point of view. In particular we analyse whether it is possible for agents to agree to form a coalition to coordinate their level of appropriation and thus, avoid the tragedy of the commons. For this purpose, we investigate how agents in a coalition choose their joint level of appropriation (depending on the behavior of appropriators outside such coalition). Finally, we propose a way of associating with each problem (of common-pool resources) a game with externalities and studied its Core.

引用

页码：390 / 402

页数：13

共 18 条

[1] AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM [J].