Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation

被引：7

作者：

Ellul, Andrew ^{[1
,2
,3
,4
]}

Wang, Cong ^{[5
]}

Zhang, Kuo ^{[6
]}

机构：

[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

[2] Ctr Econ & Policy Res, London EC1V 0DX, England

[3] Ctr Studies Econ & Finance, I-80126 Naples, Italy

[4] European Corp Governance Inst, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

[5] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Management & Econ, CUHK Business Sch, Shenzhen 518172, Peoples R China

[6] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2024年 / 70卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

unemployment risk; human capital; executive compensation; risk taking; leverage; STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGERIAL; INSURANCE; SENSITIVITIES; COSTS; PRICE;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.2023.4714

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Unemployment risk influences workers' incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. This paper investigates the impact of unemployment risk on chief executive officers (CEOs)' risk-taking incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous, boards increase the convex payoff structure of CEO pay to encourage risk taking. The increase in CEOs' convexity payoff is stronger in firms with more independent and diverse boards, higher ownership of long-term shareholders, and in industries requiring highly skilled labor. Our findings suggest that boards internalize workers' interests in firms' risk taking decisions and executive compensation is one mechanism used.

引用

页码：885 / 906

页数：23

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