The pervasive impact of ignorance

被引:8
作者
Kirfel, Lara [1 ,3 ]
Phillips, Jonathan [2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Psychol, 450 Jane Stanford Way,Bldg 420, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Dartmouth Coll, Cognit Sci Program, Winfred Raven House,5 Maynard St, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[3] Dept Psychol, 450 Jane Stanford Way,Bldg 420, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Normality; Knobe effect; Ignorance; Knowledge; Norms; Counterfactuals; PRESCRIPTIVE NORMS; INTENTIONAL ACTION; CULPABLE CONTROL; MORAL JUDGMENTS; MENTAL STATES; FOLK CONCEPT; CAUSAL; RESPONSIBILITY; KNOWLEDGE; COUNTERFACTUALS;
D O I
10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105316
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Norm violations have been demonstrated to impact a wide range of seemingly non-normative judgments. Among other things, when agents' actions violate prescriptive norms they tend to be seen as having done those actions more freely, as having acted more intentionally, as being more of a cause of subsequent outcomes, and even as being less happy. The explanation of this effect continue to be debated, with some researchers appealing to features of actions that violate norms, and other researcher emphasizing the importance of agents' mental states when acting. Here, we report the results of two large-scale experiments that replicate and extend twelve of the studies that originally demonstrated the pervasive impact of norm violations. In each case, we build on the pre-existing experimental paradigms to additionally manipulate whether the agents knew that they were violating a norm while holding fixed the action done. We find evidence for a pervasive impact of ignorance: the impact of norm violations on non-normative judgments depends largely on the agent knowing that they were violating a norm when acting. Moreover, we find evidence that the reduction in the impact of normality is underpinned by people's counterfactual reasoning: people are less likely to consider an alternative to the agent's action if the agent is ignorant. We situate our findings in the wider debate around the role or normality in people's reasoning.
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页数:15
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