CEO perquisite compensation and M&A performance

被引：0

作者：

Chan, Chia-Ying ^{[1
,4
]}

Nishikawa, Takeshi ^{[2
,3
]}

Williams, Thomas C. ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Taipei Univ, Dept Business Adm, New Taipei, Taiwan

[2] Univ North Texas, Dept FIREL, Denton, TX USA

[3] Univ North Texas, G Brint Ryan Coll Business, Dept FIREL, 1155 Union Circle 305339, Denton, TX 76203 USA

[4] Natl Taipei Univ, Business Adm, 151 Univ Rd, New Taipei 23741, Taiwan

来源：

QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE | 2023年 / 90卷

关键词：

CEO perquisite; M & A; Corporate Governance; Agency Problem; Compensation; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EMPIRICAL POWER; AGENCY PROBLEMS; PERKS; OWNERSHIP; RISK; FIRM; DEBT; SPECIFICATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.qref.2023.05.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper offers empirical evidence of the role that CEO perquisite compensations (perks) play in a firm's M & A activities. Using hand-collected panel-data on CEO perks from S & P 500 firms between 2006 and 2014, we find that the M & A deals undertaken by CEOs with high levels of perquisite receive significantly worse market reactions around the announcement period. Further, these deals experience lower post-acquisition abnormal operating and stock performance compared to the deals conducted by CEOs with low levels of perquisite. Firms whose CEOs received greater perquisite also exhibit severe crash risk. Our results are consistent with the widely held negative sentiment toward perquisite compensation.& COPY; 2023 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：162 / 177

页数：16

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