FLLF: A Fast-Lightweight Location Detection Framework for False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

被引:11
作者
Zhu, Jianxin [1 ]
Meng, Wenchao [2 ,3 ]
Sun, Mingyang [1 ]
Yang, Jun [1 ]
Song, Zhuo [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Univ, Coll Control Sci & Engn, State Key Lab Ind Control Technol, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
[2] Zhejiang Univ, Coll Control Sci & Engn, State Key Lab Ind Control Technol, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
[3] Zhejiang Univ, Key Lab CS&AUS Zhejiang Prov, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
[4] Alibaba Cloud, Basic Software Team, Beijing 100102, Peoples R China
[5] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Sch Elect Informat & Elect Engn, Shanghai 200240, Peoples R China
关键词
False data injection attack; deep neural network; early exiting mechanism; mixed-precision quantization; smart grids;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2023.3274642
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This paper proposes a fast-lightweight location detection framework (FLLF) for false data injection attacks (FDIAs). The location detection of false data injection attacks is traditionally realized by computationally intensive neural networks, which can cause large detection delays due to the limited computation power and storage resources of the detection device. By contrast, the proposed method is lightweight and can be deployed on low-cost devices such as embedded devices, significantly improving detection speed while reducing power consumption. The proposed method consists of an efficient FDIA location detection model and an automatic model search algorithm. The model is a lightweight model that enables fast and accurate attack location detection through a combination of the early exiting mechanism and mixed-precision quantization (EE-MPQ). Then, an automatic model search algorithm is designed to enable the EE-MPQ model to match the smart grids with different structures. Finally, it is shown that the proposed method can accurately detect and locate FDIAs through numerical analysis on the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus power systems.
引用
收藏
页码:911 / 920
页数:10
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