Fuzzing for CPS Mutation Testing

被引:1
作者
Lee, Jaekwon [1 ,2 ]
Vigano, Enrico [1 ]
Cornejo, Oscar [1 ]
Pastore, Fabrizio [1 ]
Briand, Lionel [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
[2] Univ Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada
来源
2023 38TH IEEE/ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMATED SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, ASE | 2023年
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Mutation testing; Fuzzing; Test data generation; GENERATION;
D O I
10.1109/ASE56229.2023.00079
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Mutation testing can help reduce the risks of releasing faulty software. For such reason, it is a desired practice for the development of embedded software running in safety-critical cyber-physical systems (CPS). Unfortunately, state-of-the-art test data generation techniques for mutation testing of C and C++ software, two typical languages for CPS software, rely on symbolic execution, whose limitations often prevent its application (e.g., it cannot test black-box components). We propose a mutation testing approach that leverages fuzz testing, which has proved effective with C and C++ software. Fuzz testing automatically generates diverse test inputs that exercise program branches in a varied number of ways and, therefore, exercise statements in different program states, thus maximizing the likelihood of killing mutants, our objective. We performed an empirical assessment of our approach with software components used in satellite systems currently in orbit. Our empirical evaluation shows that mutation testing based on fuzz testing kills a significantly higher proportion of live mutants than symbolic execution (i.e., up to an additional 47 percentage points). Further, when symbolic execution cannot be applied, fuzz testing provides significant benefits (i.e., up to 41% mutants killed). Our study is the first one comparing fuzz testing and symbolic execution for mutation testing; our results provide guidance towards the development of fuzz testing tools dedicated to mutation testing.
引用
收藏
页码:1377 / 1389
页数:13
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