Stackelberg leadership and managerial delegation under hyperbolic demand

被引：0
|
作者：
Delbono, Flavio [1 ]
Lambertini, Luca [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
[2] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, Via San Giacomo 3, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2023年 / 224卷
关键词：
Strategic delegation; First mover advantage; Hyperbolic demand; INCENTIVES; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We revisit the traditional Stackelberg model considering a hyperbolic demand function. We show that, in duopoly, there exists no incentive to acquire leadership or to separate ownership and control by hiring a manager. The reason is that best replies are orthogonal in a complete neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium. The unilateral incentive either to lead or to hire a manager is restored if the industry is at least triopolistic. This holds irrespective of the specific delegation contract being adopted. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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